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Fourteen years after he published A Theory of Justice,1 John
Rawls surprised his many readers by announcing that he no
longer believed his celebrated theory to be true.2 Not that he be-
lieved it was false either: rather, he had come to think that any
such theory must refrain from taking a position on its own valid-
ity. To claim the "truth" for one's own point of view, Rawls wor-
ried, might be construed as excessively partisan. Liberal theories
of justice must not only preach tolerance for other ways of life, but
for other theories as well.
Rawls was led to this self-effacing agnosticism by his new vi-
sion of political philosophy. The philosopher's role was no longer
the traditional one of advancing grand metaphysical theories. In
our society, reasonable people differ considerably on metaphysical
matters and, in Rawls's opinion, the philosopher could do little to
end such contentious disputes. The philosopher must therefore
lower her ambitions and settle on the more modest task of seeking
consensus at the level of practice. She must show that rival politi-
cal factions can accept the same principles of justice, even though
they may have different, and indeed incompatible, reasons for
doing so. This happy convergence Rawls termed the "overlapping
consensus."
3
According to Rawls, the appeal to metaphysics is not only fu-
tile, but also unwise. The philosopher must take great pains to
avoid invoking any unnecessary theoretical claims, for such posi-
tions might prove controversial and endanger the hoped-for con-
sensus. Rawls dubbed this non-committal strategy the "method of
avoidance" and insisted that the political philosopher follow it
rigorously. A reasonable political theory must remain as disinter-
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ested as possible-even to the seemingly perverse extent that it
profess neutrality about the truth of its own assertions.
To many, this description of philosophical reasoning was at
once unrecognizable and unappealing. The task of the political
philosopher, it is commonly thought, is to argue for the truth of
certain political doctrines; a philosophical theory is normally not
abandoned simply because some cannot be persuaded of its valid-
ity. This is not to say, of course, that Rawls's conciliatory ap-
proach has no appeal whatsoever. It would be great if an overlap-
ping consensus could be found and, insofar as political philoso-
phers can pitch their ideas to bring this about, so much the better.
The problem lies with Rawls's claim that any political theory in-
capable of generating an overlapping consensus must fail as a
philosophical analysis. Philosophy is supposed to be about truth,
not consequences.
In Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, Cass Sunstein
takes up Rawls's method of avoidance and cleverly applies it to
the case of legal reasoning. As Sunstein sees it, lawyers have de-
veloped a special strategy for dealing with the fact of pluralism.
Instead of answering specific legal questions by applying contro-
versial moral or political theories to particular fact patterns, legal
reasoners rely on rules and low-level principles of law to settle
controversies. The law seeks to establish what Sunstein calls
"incompletely theorized agreements." For example, the right of
workers to unionize can be grounded in many different ways (p 5).
It can be seen as protecting the basic rights of workers, as foster-
ing democratic objectives or ensuring industrial peace. While each
theory is controversial, each nonetheless supports the right of
workers to form unions. A judge presiding over a labor case
should therefore try to resolve any dispute on the basis of legal
principles that command consensus, rather than invoke an un-
necessarily divisive justification for unionization. By avoiding ab-
stractions and high theory, the law attempts to paper over alien-
ating differences and play up unifying similarities.
While the "incompletely theorized agreement" is a clear ana-
logue of the Rawlsian "overlapping consensus," Sunstein wisely
does not follow Rawls in his meta-ethical agnosticism. Sunstein
sees nothing wrong with endorsing the legitimacy of his own ac-
count:
There is, however, an exception to the general claim that I
have made throughout this chapter. In order for participants
in law (or democracy) to accept that general claim, they must
accept at least one general theory: The theory that I have at-
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tempted to defend. This is the theory that tells them to favor
incompletely theorized agreements (p 60).
Nor does Sunstein ever claim that a legal argument that fails to
command universal assent is incorrect. Consensus is an ideal to
strive for, not a definition of legal validity.
Sunstein's application of the method of avoidance to legal
reasoning also sidesteps another difficulty associated with
Rawls's position. Given that the Rawlsian overlapping consensus
must relate to the principles governing the basic structure of soci-
ety, the search for such universal assent has to take place at a
highly theoretical level. Rival political, religious and cultural
groups must be shown that their conceptions of the Good, Right
and Personality share enough elements in common. However,
such a discourse would be impossibly abstract. To think that even
a tiny fraction of the populace can participate in an overlapping
consensus is, at best, extremely optimistic.
Unlike philosophical 'analysis, legal reasoning generally
takes place at a significantly more concrete level. Legal controver-
sies are usually resolved by reference to specific rules and low-
level principles whose content can be understood by the general
public. It is therefore not unusual for the local and national news
to report on recent court decisions. Indeed, if legal reasoning were
as dense and impenetrable as philosophical reasoning, it is un-
likely that the O.J. Simpson criminal trial would have been the
media sensation that it was. Consequently, the claim that legal
reasoning can generate consensus on particular outcomes does
not seem hopelessly utopian.
Because Sunstein's proposal inherits the appeal of Rawls's
idea while avoiding its problems, Legal Reasoning and Political
Conflict should be read by all those who are interested in the rela-
tionship between law and political diversity. It is an ambitious
and provocative attempt to understand the structure of legal rea-
soning in general and to situate legal practice within the institu-
tional context of modern democratic society. In an era of divided
government, an ideologically unstable Supreme Court, and a ri-
diculously politicized confirmation process, the book offers an al-
ternative vision of law which sees in it the potential to minimize
our differences and express our shared aspirations.
The book itself is an amalgam of three previously published
law review pieces,4 and the dovetailing unfortunately is rough:
, See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv L Rev 1733
(1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 86 Cal L Rev 953 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein,
On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv L Rev 741 (1993).
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the final product has a choppy, "cut-and-pasted" feel to it. Given
these origins, however, I found the book remarkably accessible. It
quite skillfully avoids technical language and is studded with
dozens of helpful and well explained examples. Sunstein admira-
bly succeeds at his general aim, mentioned in the Preface, to write
a book on legal theory intelligible to those with no formal training
in law (p ix).
Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict neatly divides into two
main themes. The first attempts to explain why judges shy away
from theory when deciding cases. Having developed his account of
incompletely theorized agreements, Sunstein goes on to ask
whether judges should decide cases based on rules or on more
open-ended norms, such as standards, guidelines, and factors.
Sunstein's answer is that the rule of law allows for the exercise of
casuistry, which is the practice of settling disputes in a ruleless,
case-by-case fashion (pp 121-35).
In this short review, I concentrate exclusively on the first
theme, that of the incomplete theorization of the law. I do this
primarily because the idea challenged in'the second theme-that
rule-bound adjudication is always desirable-has been effectively
rebutted by others in the past, and Sunstein adds little to this de-
bate.5 Besides, Sunstein's account of incompletely theorized legal
agreements is, by itself, sufficiently novel and interesting to merit
a sustained discussion.
After sketching his account of incompletely theorized agree-
ments, I suggest that Sunstein has it backwards: legal reasoning
is incompletely theorized because theory is generally
irrelevant for the resolution of controversies. The application of
Rawls's method of avoidance to law is, therefore, ultimately mis-
guided, despite its initial promise. For according to this alterna-
tive explanation, judges should not be seen as concealing the true
bases of their decisions in the name of social unity; rather, it is
the fact that theory is usually inapposite that accounts for the
reticence of judges to pontificate on the foundations of the law.
See, for example, Frederick F. Schauer, Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Ex-
amination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 167-74 (Oxford 1991); Joseph
Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality
210, 223-29 (Oxford 1979). On the choice between rules and standards see Scott Jonathan
Shapiro, Rules and Practical Reasoning 286-92 (unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia
University) (1996) (on file with U Chi L Rev); Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv L Rev 22 (1992); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L J 65 (1983).
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I. BETTER TO REMAIN SILENT AND THOUGHT THE FOOL
The stated aim of Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict is to
dissolve, at least partially, the perceived mystery of legal reason-
ing (p vii). Unfortunately, Sunstein never quite tells us what he
takes the mystery to be. My sense is that he is not concerned with
the fact that the law can be hard to understand if one is not a
lawyer. There is nothing mysterious about this-the law responds
to complicated social phenomena and, by necessity, has developed
an intricate, and sometimes baroque, framework and vocabulary.
In this regard, the law is no different from chemistry or account-
ing.
I take it that Sunstein is focusing on something else which
makes the law unique. While other disciplines, such as physics,
economics, and philosophy, constantly strive towards greater sys-
temization and rigor, the law has no such pretensions. The law is
not particularly seduced by theory: judges exhibit little desire to
be either moral philosophers or social scientists. The law's limited
ambition is puzzling and cries out for an explanation.
As I have mentioned, Sunstein thinks that incomplete theori-
zation is a good thing. Although not against theory per se, Sun-
stein wants theory-mongering to remain the province of acade-
mia. The virtues of theory for the practicing lawyer and judge are
usually outweighed by its vices.
At first glance, Sunstein's claim may seem perverse. For he is
not just against bad theory, but also against good theory. But
what could be troubling about good theory? Wouldn't a good the-
ory allow a judge to justify her rulings by showing how they are
well reasoned and not the products of rank intuition, bias or ca-
price?
Sunstein, however, sees many pitfalls in highly theorized le-
gal practice. First and foremost, a good theory can be problematic
when others do not agree that it is a good theory (pp 38-41). Given
that we live in a heterogeneous society where there is a lack of
consensus with regards to large-scale social issues, agreement on
general moral and political principles is very unlikely. The law
compensates for this "social dissensus" (p 39) by refusing to pro-
vide deep justifications for its judgments, relying instead on low-
and mid-level principles to marshal the required support. If, for
example, a court wishes to impose a rule of strict liability for cer-
tain ultrahazardous activities, it may prefer to be silent about
some of the tendentious justifications often invoked on that doc-
trine's behalf, such as economic efficiency, protection of basic
rights, and distributive justice. The court should instead appeal
directly to the strict liability principle because nearly everyone
1997]
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can agree that the rule is sound, though for very different rea-
sons. This "constructive use[ ] of silence" (p 39) avoids the social
instability that would result from a fully theorized, but poten-
tially controversial, judgment.
Incompletely theorized agreements may not command una-
nimity but they can go a long way towards minimizing conflict.
Opponents of abortion rights may never be comfortable with Roe v
Wade.' Still, courts reaffirming that decision ought not invoke in
its support the idea that the fetus is not a person (p 40). To do so
might further antagonize those who believe that abortion is mur-
der. As Sunstein argues, those who lose a given decision lose
much more when that decision invokes a large-scale political the-
ory at odds with their own convictions. "If judges disavow large-
scale theories, then losers in particular cases lose much less. They
lose a decision, but not the world. They may win on another occa-
sion." (p 41).
Sunstein believes that minimally theorized legal practice can
also help foster mutual respect (pp 39-40). In those situations
where incompletely theorized agreements are possible, the ad-
vancement of a controversial legal theory can do nothing but in-
sult and antagonize the losing parties. The refusal to challenge
another's strong convictions shows respect for, and affirms the
reasonableness of, that person's theory of the Good.
Despite the strong liberal themes running through his work,
Sunstein does not place the same degree of faith in the courts as
does much of contemporary liberalism. He is wary of any attempt
by a court to articulate and defend abstract principles of political
morality, liberal or otherwise. Sunstein therefore argues that
complete theorization by unelected judges is presumptively un-
democratic and offends the rule of law (pp 44-46). In general, the
only place for high theory outside the academy is in the domain of
democratic politics, where citizens can decide for themselves
which comprehensive theory of the Good they find most appeal-
ing.
Having touted the many benefits of incompletely theorized
agreements,7 Sunstein goes on to argue that the law's characteris-
tic forms of reasoning are particularly well suited to producing
them. For example, rules are advantageous to a legal system, ac-
cording to Sunstein, in large part because they make it unneces-
sary for legal actors to theorize (pp 44-46, 110-11). A policeman
410 US 113 (1973).
Sunstein mentions several more mundane benefits of incompletely theorized agree-
ments. For example, he rightly points out that theorizing is costly and often not worth the
effort. Moreover, it takes talent to theorize well, a talent not all judges have (p 4 2 ).
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need not invoke a theory of criminal punishment in order to give a
driver a ticket for going over 55 miles per hour.
Not surprisingly, Sunstein is also a big supporter of the
much-maligned "argument by analogy" (pp 62-70). While critics
have complained that analogical reasoning is insufficiently rigor-
ous, Sunstein thinks that its strength lies precisely in its theoreti-
cal modesty. If parties agree that case A is similar to case B, they
need not invoke a grand theory to explain the similarity. They can
rest content with their agreement and some low-level accounting
for that consensus. People can agree that sexual discrimination is
like racial discrimination and should be treated similarly without
having to provide a full-fledged theory of discrimination to justify
the analogy.
II. Is PLURALISM REALLY TO BLAME?
Sunstein's observation that the law is incompletely theorized
is hard to challenge. The standard judicial opinion bears little re-
semblance to the standard philosophical treatise. But what is the
explanation for this phenomenon? Sunstein thinks that it is pri-
marily a reaction to pluralism.
I don't think, however, that this hypothesis withstands closer
examination. The chief benefit of incompletely theorized agree-
ments, according to Sunstein, is that they stave off political con-
flict. This motivation is appropriate for public law controver-
sies-political constituencies have concrete opinions in these ar-
eas, opinions which are often theorized. On major political issues,
many people are able to identify themselves as liberals, libertari-
ans, comnnunitarians, or fundamentalists. If a court of law took a
position on one of these comprehensive views, it would undoubt-
edly cause dissent and friction.
By contrast, very few people have any idea which principles
underpin their views about private law. Although people can
agree that under most circumstances contracts should be en-
forced, negligent tortfeasors held liable, and property rights pro-
tected, virtually no one has any clue whether these practices are
best explained or justified by Kantian, utilitarian, Aristotelian, or
economic principles. If a court took a position on any of these
views, the political culture would very likely remain unaffected.
Theoretical conflict at this level is the stuff of tenure battles, not
social revolutions.
It is disturbing that the strongest reason Sunstein can mus-
ter for incompletely theorized agreements does not apply to pri-
vate law. This substantially weakens the claim that the notion of
an incompletely theorized agreement is "a key to understanding
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legal reasoning" (p 191). At best, it can illuminate the methods of
argumentation in public law contexts, areas in which, perhaps re-
vealingly, Sunstein has concentrated most of his past efforts.
It is even doubtful whether the avoidance of conflict can be an
appropriate explanation for the incomplete theorization of public
law. If theorization were thought valuable but for its divisive po-
tential, judges could have opted for "multiple," as opposed to
"incomplete," theorization. A judge could show how a given ruling
can be justified from a number of perspectives, thereby skirting
the political conflict that Sunstein believes would follow from ju-
dicial theorization. Indeed, multiple theorization might be more
effective than incomplete theorization in avoiding conflict because
it would demonstrate to all interested parties that a consensus
should form with respect to the legal principles being invoked.
The fact that the law does not opt for multiple theorization shows,
I think, that, with regard to the decision about whether to theo-
rize, it is not particularly concerned with the avoidance of political
conflict.
Sunstein's claim that incompletely theorized agreements fos-
ter mutual respect is also suspect. Clearly Sunstein would be
right if multiple theories could each account for the entirety of the
law. In such circumstances, very little would be gained if a judge
gratuitously offered her opinion about which theory she thought
to be the correct one. However, if one theory is manifestly supe-
rior to another in justifying the law and can be seen as animating
its development, wouldn't it be fraudulent not to tell the losing
party that this theory was the basis of her decision? Sunstein's in-
completely theorized agreement bears an unflattering resem-
blance to Plato's "noble lie":8 it may be well intentioned insofar as
its aim is to promote social stability, but it is still a paternalistic
whitewashing of the truth.
At this point Sunstein might want to trade platonic pejora-
tives. A herculean judge who completely theorized every opinion
would be akin to a "philosopher-king" who spins out high-minded
and high-brow accounts of the Good for the rest of us to follow.
Yet, Sunstein would argue, in a democratic society, a judge's job is
not to inquire into the form of the Good and then report his find-
ings to the poor benighted souls shackled to the walls of the cave;
it is to implement the will of the people. The rule of law must pre-
vail over the rule of men, even if they happen to be very wise men.
B See Plato, Republic Book III, 414b-415c (Basic 1968) (Allan Bloom, trans). I thank
David Carlson for this analogy.
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But is complete theorization inimical to democratic self-rule?
It is only inimical, it seems to me, when the theory is not a good
interpretation of the law. In such cases, a judge would be substi-
tuting his own sense of right and wrong for the will of the people
or the judgment of previous courts. However, if the theory can be
seen, in some suitable sense, as explaining and justifying the case
law and statutory materials, then the advancement and applica-
tion of the theory would be in the service of democracy, not in
derogation of it. Philosopher-kings are objectionable not because
they are "philosophers," but because they are "kings." Philoso-
pher-kings don't care about what the workers, auxiliaries, or past
philosopher-kings may think. A philosopher-judge, by contrast,
need not, and indeed must not, be so arrogant.
III. THE HISTORICAL CLAIM
Sunstein offers his account of incompletely theorized agree-
ments not only as a vision of how the law ought to decide par-
ticular controversies but also as a descriptive thesis about why
the law reasons in the manner that it does. He claims that judges
tend to shy away from abstractions because they recognize that
complete theorization would lead to social instability.
What historical evidence does Sunstein offer for this claim?
None, as far as I can tell. Nor does he seem to think that a histori-
cal case needs to be made. Sunstein's argument for the descriptive
claim seems to be derived exclusively from his normative position:
since legal reasoning is incompletely theorized and incomplete
theorization is an appropriate response to the problems of plural-
ism, then the law must have chosen this route because of its vir-
tues.
Although this reasoning is not fallacious, the second premise
is false. As I have argued, the virtues of incompletely theorized
agreements cannot lie in their tendency to cabin political conflict.
The failure of Sunstein's normative thesis, therefore, undermines
his descriptive argument.
Moreover, even if Sunstein had tried to mount an historical
argument, I doubt that he would have met with much success. For
if Sunstein were correct that judges generally refrain from theori-
zation in order to avoid exacerbating the problems of pluralism,
one would expect legal reasoning to be more completely theorized
in more homogeneous societies. In fact, the degree of theorization
does not seem to increase with the level of a society's cultural ho-
mogeneity.9
If anything, the reverse is true-theorizing decreases as homogeneity increases. See
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Consider the case of the common law. For many centuries
English society was significantly more homogeneous than that of
twentieth-century America. One would have thought, if Sunstein
were correct, that English common law judges would have taken
the opportunity to theorize at will. But this does not seem to have
been the case. The common law judges used the same basic tech-
niques of legal reasoning that American courts now employ: they
relied on rules, standards, and analogies. English judges were
neither social scientists nor philosophers and generally expressed
very little desire to be either one. Lords Cairns and Cranworth,
for example, did not justify the rule of strict liability in Rylands v
Fletcher'° by reference to economic efficiency or a full-blown
Kantian account of personal responsibility. They cited authority,
analogized the holdings from past cases, and offered some vague
and passing thoughts about the justice of strict liability in order
to justify their ruling. The opinion itself is remarkably under-
theorized. As A.W.B. Simpson has explained, the common law
never was the bastion of high theory that some legal academics
tend to think it is:
Today, and indeed for many centuries, the common law sys-
tem has been the product of a prolonged exercise in casuistry,
an activity more generally associated with moral reasoning.
... High theory has never caused much anxiety to practical
lawyers, and since Chaucer's time, and indeed long before,
the study of cases has been the principal mechanism whereby
a person came to rank as a truly learned law-
yer ....11
The same might be said for the Mishnah and Gemara, the
written records of the Hebrew oral tradition as it existed circa 200
A.D. and 600 A.D., respectively, in Palestine and Babylonia. Legal
disputes were resolved using many of the same tools we use to-
day: the pharisees cited authority, argued by analogy, and offered
reductiones ad absurdum. Rarely was theology introduced to set-
tle particular questions of law.12 Indeed, the Mishnahl3 and Ge-
text accompanying note 14.
10 LR 3 HL 330 (1868).
A.W.B. Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law 1 (Oxford 1995).
See, for example, Aaron Kirschenbaum, Equity in Jewish Law: Beyond Equity: Ha-
lakhic Aspirationism in Jewish Civil Law 199 (Yeshiva 1991).
" See Menachem Elon, 3 Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles 1072-73 (Jewish
Publication Socy 1994) (Bernard Auerbach and Melvin J. Sykes, trans) (stating that the
Mishnah is drafted in a casuistic, non-rule-like manner, in contrast to contemporary stat-
ute books).
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mara14 are significantly more casuistic in approach than current
American legal practice. If Sunstein were correct, one would have
thought that the relative homogeneity of Palestinian and Babylo-
nian culture would have permitted the pharisees to show how
their rulings were, in many instances, part of God's master plan.
This, however, they did not do. 15
IV. OTIOSE, NOT ODIOUS
If Sunstein is wrong and pluralism is not the theory-
retarding force that he claims it to be, then why are judicial opin-
ions incompletely theorized? Let me suggest the following expla-
nation: judges rarely proffer general theories to support their
rulings because such theories are scarcely relevant in adjudica-
tion. This is so for several reasons.
First, judges usually occupy positions within chains of com-
mand and are thereby precluded from challenging the propriety of
rules issued by those of greater authority. If a judge determines
that a statute or ruling in a higher court applies in a given case,
she is duty-bound, by virtue of her institutional position, to apply
it. It is simply irrelevant whether the judge thinks that the rule is
a good one or that the decision in the case produces, all things
considered, the best result; what legally matters is the fact of the
rule's applicability, not its rationality. Sunstein therefore misun-
derstands the reason why judges do not invoke philosophical or
economic analysis when applying the rules of strict liability in,
say, products liability cases. Given a determination that the rules
apply, the attempt to justify the rules themselves is otiose, not, as
Sunstein thinks, odious.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in civil law countries,
where the value of legislative supremacy is paramount, judicial
opinions are conspicuously less theorized than those in common
law countries. The average French decision, for example, contains
three hundred words and the average German decision consists of
" Adin Steinsaltz, The Essential Talmud 198-200 (Basic 1976) (Chaya Galai, trans)
(arguing that the Talmud avoids abstractions in favor of reasoning from concrete models).
It is possible that there were unique factors present in both the common law and
Talmudic traditions which, despite the relative uniformity of their respective societies,
made theorization unattractive. This would allow Sunstein to claim, in perhaps a some-
what ad hoc fashion, that the incomplete theorization of legal reasoning in twentieth-
century America is a reaction to pluralism, whereas the incomplete theorization of legal
reasoning in pre-twentieth-century England and Babylonia were responses to other issues
particular to those systems. My argument in the text should therefore not be taken as a de-
cisive refutation of Sunstein's descriptive thesis, but rather as a shifting of the burden of
proof.
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two thousand words, compared with the eight-thousand-word av-
erage for majority opinions of the United States. 6
Second, even in situations where judges are not so con-
strained, foundational ruminations may be just as unhelpful,
given that moral theories tend to be couched in highly abstract
terms and difficult to apply in particular cases. Kantians, for ex-
ample, admonish us to treat people as "ends in themselves," not
merely as "means." We know what this prescribes in model cases:
one is treated merely like a means rather than an end when one
is assaulted or swindled. But is it a violation of the categorical
imperative to prevent someone from suing a sitting president for
sexual harassment? It would be futile for a judge to invoke Foun-
dations of the Metaphysics of Morals to answer that question.'7
Often, then, judicial opinions are incompletely theorized be-
cause theory cannot affect the legal outcome (either because of the
peremptoriness of legal rules or the vagueness of ethical models).
However, even in those situations where a general theory can be
applied in a particular case, it is unlikely that it will be relevant
for the resolution of the litigation. This, I claim, follows from the
very same factor that requires courts to exhibit their reasoning in
the first place: without providing reasons for their rulings, courts
could not legitimate their potentially coercive actions. Judges,
unlike juries, have a legal responsibility to justify their actions to
those affected. But in order to create the impression of legiti-
macy, it is unnecessary for them to show how each of their deci-
sions can be derived from first principles. They need only demon-
strate the soundness of their legal conclusions against the chal-
lenges of the losing party to the dispute. 8
Will the parties to a suit raise highly theoretical challenges in
litigation? Most probably not. First, most reasonable ethical theo-
ries generally produce the same results. Utilitarians, Kantians
and Aristotelians all think they can explain why we should keep
our promises, give to charity, and refrain from murder. This
"overlapping consensus" is hardly surprising-if any of these
theories conflicted with a large number of our moral intuitions,
we would have rejected it long ago. Consequently, litigants will
" See Michel Troper, Christopher Grzegorczyk, and Jean-Louis Gradies, Statutory In-
terpretation in France, in D. Neil McCormick and Robert S. Summers, eds, Interpreting
Statutes: A Comparative Study 171, 172 (Dartmouth 1991).
" Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Bobbs-Merrill 1969)
(Lewis White Beck, trans).
"8 Unofficially, of course, courts may have other audiences in mind. They may wish to
persuade other judges to adopt their positions, or, in unusual cases, to quell public unrest
that they fear might arise because of their rulings.
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rarely gain an advantage by invoking one grand theory rather
than another in their legal challenges.
Second, very few lawyers have either the talent or training to
raise such theoretical objections. As Sunstein himself notes, legal
actors sometimes find disagreements about basic principles
"deeply confusing" (p 191). Hence, even when fundamental theo-
ries give differing results in particular cases, challenges couched
in philosophical or economic terms will rarely find their way into
briefs. Because judges are only required to respond in kind, they
will justify their rulings solely in standard legal terms, by refer-
ence to rules, principles, or general policy considerations. These
methods of argumentation do command consensus and, therefore,
do not have to be further justified."
This discussion suggests that as soon as consensus about the
appropriate legal methods or principles breaks down, founda-
tional issues will become more important in deciding cases and
judicial opinions will tend to be more theorized. Not only is this
correlation intuitively plausible, but it seems to be borne out by
the historical record. According to Professor Simpson, discussions
about the appropriate rule of recognition for the common law be-
gan as soon as the homogeneity of the bench ended.
In a tightly cohesive group there will exist a wide measure of
consensus upon basic ideas and values as well as upon what
views are tenable. Argument and discussion will commonly
produce agreement in the end, and so long as this is the case
there will be little interest in how or why this consensus is
achieved.... When however cohesion has begun to break
down, and a failure to achieve consensus becomes a com-
moner phenomenon, interest will begin to develop in the for-
mulation of tests as to how the correctness of legal proposi-
tions can be demonstrated. 0
Simpson believes that the law of citations and stare decisis was
developed only as recently as the last century. Given shared
agreements, justifications of those practices were considered un-
necessary. When consensus disappeared, however, the need to
address the foundational issues became pressing. This result is
hard to reconcile with Sunstein's position. If Sunstein were right,
" Not that judges themselves are in love with theory. Indeed, lawyers are generally not
trained as theorists because judges aren't either. With the advent of a more academic
bench, however, we should expect to see more completely theorized opinions and briefs. To
a large extent, this has already happened in antitrust cases, as Sunstein himself notes (p
55).
A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in A.W.B. Simpson, ed, Oxford
Essays in Jurisprudence (Second Series) 77, 98 (Oxford 1973).
1997]
The University of Chicago Law Review
legal reasoning should have become less theorized as consensus
broke down, not more.
V. NORMAL SCIENCE AND NORMAL LAW
The mysterious nature of legal reasoning turns out to be no
mystery at all. Judges rarely theorize because it is rarely helpful
to do so. Sunstein, therefore, has offered a special explanation for
a phenomenon which needs no special explanation. It is not as if
judges have compelling reasons to theorize which are neverthe-
less outweighed by even more compelling reasons not to theorize.
The incomplete theorization of judicial opinions is a result of the
absence of any pressing need to theorize in the first place.
The problem with Sunstein's presuppositions runs even
deeper than this. The motivation for his account, one might recall,
is to explain the law's limited theoretical ambitions. However, le-
gal reasoning is not unique in this regard. Scientific reasoning, for
example, is itself usually incompletely theorized.
Consider Thomas Kuhn's characterization of normal scientific
practice.2 According to Kuhn, before research achieves the status
of "normal science," those who engage in scientific debates must
completely theorize their arguments.22 Given the absence of any
established paradigm, researchers cannot assume that others ei-
ther know of their starting points or agree with them. Laying out
their assumptions is necessary to justify their particular point of
view on the issue at hand. The emergence of a paradigm, how-
ever, changes all that. "When the individual scientist can take a
paradigm for granted, he need no longer, in his major works, at-
tempt to build his field anew, starting from first principles and
justifying the use of each concept introduced. That can be left to
the writer of textbooks.""
One of the distinguishing characteristics of normal science,
therefore, is that its researchers are free to engage in incom-
pletely theorized argumentation. Given that the paradigm is
known and accepted by all, there is no need to invoke it in justi-
fying one's position. Complete theorization is, according to Kuhn,
not indicative of standard scientific practice, but is rather a sign
of confusion or revolution within the research community.
With respect to theorization, therefore, normal legal practice
is no different from normal scientific practice. Given the general
irrelevance of foundational issues to settling controversies in
"See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structu)-e of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 2d ed 1970).
Id at 13.
Id at 19-20.
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these fields, general theories will seldom be invoked to justify
competing points of view. To be sure, the reasons why foundations
are generally immaterial in court differ from those that apply in
the lab. In the case of normal science, the invocation of the para-
digm is generally unhelpful because, given its near universal ac-
ceptance, every respectable position is consistent with it. No sci-
entist can gain an advantage by wheeling out the basic theory in
his polemics. By contrast, there may be no deep consensus about
the theoretical underpinnings of the law. Nevertheless, this does
not mean that most legal arguments hinge, or are perceived to
hinge, on foundational issues. In fact, as we have seen, it is rare
that a litigant can gain, or realizes he can gain, leverage in a legal
argument by invoking an abstract philosophical theory; hence, le-
gal opinions will also tend to be incompletely theorized.
CONCLUSION
Although I have disagreed with Sunstein's explanation of the
law's incomplete theorization, at a more abstract level we agree.
According to both of our outlooks, legal reasoning is not exclu-
sively preoccupied with demonstrating that a certain legal propo-
sition follows from a set of justified premises. It is also deeply con-
cerned with justifying the proposition to specific audiences. Given
the need to legitimate its actions to those affected, the law will
necessarily invoke certain premises to support its conclusions and
take others for granted. What the law decides to invoke will de-
pend on which ideas and values are shared in the target commu-
nity and which will be challenged.
Ultimately, I think the strength of Legal Reasoning and Po-
litical Conflict lies in its emphasis on this "pragmatic" aspect of
adjudication. If we forget that judges are interested not only in
showing that their rulings are correct but also in justifying them
to those who agree in part and disagree in part, we will fail to ap-
preciate the actual structure of legal reasoning.
Past this point, however, our "overlapping consensus" col-
lapses. Sunstein thinks that judges refrain from justifying those
beliefs which are shared for fear of invoking those which are un-
shared. I have argued that judges rarely need to probe past the
level of consensus. When beliefs are uncontroversial, no one will
think that they have to be justified. It is only when consensus
breaks down that justification becomes pressing. When that hap-
pens, instead of fearing theory, judges will begin to embrace it.
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